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be established. 56 The trend is certainly in that direction.57 The language
of precedent written when medical knowledge was far more limited should
not petrify the law.5 8 Rather, the courts should recognize that they already have the tools to separate fact from fraud.5"
Unfortunately, the Florida Supreme Court apparently never considered either the advancing frontiers of science or the trend in other
jurisdictions. Instead, the court decided, without explanation, not to shift
to the tortfeasor some of the price of living in an urban society that is often placed on the injured person.
ROBERT J. VAN DER WALL

GASOLINE DEALERS' REMEDIES AGAINST
DEALERSHIP TERMINATION
Marinello entered into a lease and dealer agreement with appellant
Shell Oil Company. The contracts were executed simultaneously, to run
for identical three year primary periods and were renewable thereafter
from year to year. The lease was terminable by Marinello at any time
upon 90 days notice, at the end of the primary period or at the end of the
subsequent year. Either party could terminate the dealer contract at any
time by giving ten days notice. Shell Oil Company gave notice of termination and brought suit for possession of the premises. The suit was
consolidated with Marinello's action seeking injunctive relief and reformation of the agreements. The trial court granted reformation, 1 to include
an implied covenant by appellant to renew the agreements so long as respondent substantially performed his obligations thereunder.' On direct
certification, the Supreme Court of New Jersey, held, modified and af56. Id. at §§ 20.2, 52.
57. Id. at § 20.53.
58. See Wallace v. Coca-Cola Bottling Plants, Inc., 269 A.2d 117 (Me. 1970). See also
J. FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 148-59 (1930).
59. Wallace v. Coca-Cola Bottling Plants, Inc., 269 A.2d 117 (Me. 1970).
1. Shell Oil Co. v. Marinello, 120 N.J. Super. 357, 294 A.2d 253 (Ch. Div. 1972).
2. Marinello's principal obligations under the lease (prepared by Shell Oil Co.) were:
(1) to pay rent; (2) to furnish a security deposit; (3) to keep the station open twenty-four
hours a day, subject to local ordinance; (4) to keep the station clean and in good repair;
and (5) to use the premises only for the operation of a service station. Shell agreed to sell
Shell gasoline and products, and to license respondent to use Shell's trademarks, brandnames and identifications. Shell Oil Co. v. Marinello, 120 N.J. Super. 357, 358, 294 A.2d
253, 257-58 (Ch. Div. 1972).
In the trial court, Shell contended that Marinello had failed to perform obligations three
and four. Marinello's evidence indicated knowledge and acquiescence by Shell in his deviations from the specified business hours. He also produced evidence that the station was clean
and well run. The supreme court upheld the trial court's finding that respondent had substantially complied with his obligations. Id. at 378-82, 307 A.2d at 603.
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firmed: A clause in a lease and dealer agreement between an oil company
and a service station operator which provides for termination by either
party without good cause is void as violative of public policy, and, hereafter, a showing that the terminated party failed to substantially perform
his contractual obligations will be required. Marinello v. Shell Oil Co., 63
N.J. 402, 307 A.2d 598 (1973).
Marinello is the first case to provide gasoline dealers with a broadlyapplicable remedy against termination by the oil companies. In giving
literal effect to termination clauses, the courts have historically treated
them as unseemly but legitimate offspring of the parties' freedom to contract.' The available avenues of relief have generally required proof of
wrongful conduct by the terminating party, such as anti-trust violations,'
or independent torts.5
In Division of Triple T. Services v. Mobil Oil Co.,' the court explored
the remedial potential of Uniform Commercial Code section 2-302,' the
unconscionability clause, as addressed to facts similar to those in Marinello. Although section 2-302 was "assumed" to be applicable to the
dealer contract, 8 the termination clause was held not unconscionable.'
Thus, from the dealer's standpoint, the Code, by focusing inquiry upon
the bargaining relationship of the parties, effected a diagnosis, but not a
cure.
3. Bushwick-Decatur Motors, Inc., v. Ford Motor Co., 116 F.2d 675 (2d Cir. 1940);
Sharpe v. Great Lakes Steel Corp., 9 F.R.D. 691 (S.D.N.Y. 1950); In All States Service Station v. Standard Oil Co., 120 F.2d 714 (D.C. Cir. 1941), the oil company sought to terminate
upon ten days notice, as provided in the contract. In affirming the lower court's judgment
that the notice was sufficient, the court stated: "The contract set the period that the notice
must run. The Service Station agreed by contract that ten days' notice sufficiently protected
its position." Id. at 715. But see Clausen and Sons, Inc. v. Theodore Hamms Brewing Co.,
395 F.2d 388 (8th Cir. 1968), holding that an exclusive franchise dealer who was terminated
before he could recoup his investment has a breach of contract claim against his franchisor.
The basis of the claim was an implied term of reasonable duration.
4. Anti-trust remedies are discussed in Wade, Some Anti-Trust Problems in Terminating
Franchises, 44 ST. JoHNs L. Rxv. 23 (1969), and Horton, Legal Remedies of a Distributor
Terminated Pursuant to a ContractualProvision of Termination Upon Due Notice, 3 CREIGHToN L. REv. 88 (1969). See also Mobil Oil Co. v. Rubenfeld, 72 Misc. 2d 392, 339 N.Y.S.2d
623 (Civ. Ct. 1972), which held Mobil's coercion of the dealer to engage in anti-trust violations to be a breach of the fiduciary relationship between producer and dealer.
5. See GelUiorn, Limitations on Contract Termination Rights-Franchise Cancellations,
1967 DuxE L.J. 465, 483-85.
6. 60 Misc. 2d 720, 304 N.Y.S.2d 191 (Sup. Ct. 1969).
7. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 12A: 2-302 (1962).
8. Citing UNuoRa Cowwncm CoDE § 1-102, Comment 1, the court reasoned that the
U.C.C. was designed to facilitate development of the law in light of changing commercial
practices. Also cited were several cases applying the Code to analogous circumstances: e.g.,
Sinkoff Beverage Co. v. Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co., 51 Misc. 2d 446, 273 N.Y.S.2d 364
(Sup. Ct. Spec. T. 1966) (beer distributorship); Hertz Commercial Leas. Corp. v. Transport
Credit House, 59 Misc. 2d 226, 298 N.Y.S.2d 392 (Civ. Ct. 1969) (equipment leasing contract).
9. The reasons cited were: (1) the clause was not so one-sided as to oppress or surprise; (2) the dealer claimed no oppression, surprise or lack of mutual benefit; (3) U.C.C.
§ 2-309 allows termination upon reasonable notice. Division of Triple-T. Services v. Mobil
Oil Co., 60 Misc. 2d 720, 730, 304 N.Y.S.2d 191, 201-2 (Sup. Ct. 1969).
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The fact that the Marinello decision grants a remedy against termination without regard to independent wrongful conduct" makes it distinctive; that it declares a principle broadly applicable to other gasoline
dealers makes it unique. The rationale derives, not from a strained interpretation of the particular facts, but from a public policy evaluation of the
oil company-dealer relationship. Due to the overwhelming bargaining superiority of the oil companies, this relationship is essentially the same,
regardless of particular company or locale." The uniformity of the relationship begets the potential impact of the remedy.
Two celebrated New Jersey Supreme Court opinions provide authority for the remedy: Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 2 and its
progeny, Ellsworth Dobbs, Inc. v. Johnson." These cases set forth a
three-part test for declaring contractual clauses void as against public
policy: (1) a disparity in bargaining power must exist; (2) the disparity
must engender "grossly unfair" contractual provisions; (3) the provisions must tend to injure the public in some way. 4 Marinello signals an
expansion of the Henningsen principle by applying it to a contract between two commercial parties.
A consideration of the first part of the test--disparity in bargaining
power-illustrates the expansion. In Henningsen, the relevant bargaining
relationship was that of automobile manufacturer and individual purchaser.
The parties in Dobbs were a real estate broker and private homeowner. Both cases thus involved a commercial party and a non-commercial consumer of that party's goods or services. Shell's relationship with
Marinello, a businessman with ten years experience as a Shell dealer at
the time he signed the contracts, should be examined in this light.
There is authority for distinguishing commercial and non-commer10. In the trial court, Marinello asserted the defense of unclean hands to Shell's dispossessory action. He contended that his refusal to buy tires, batteries and accessories (TBA)
in the quantities solicited, and to sell gasoline at Shell's recommended price, were the actual
reasons for termination. It was further asserted that Shell had discriminated against Marinello
in tank-wagon gasoline prices. The trial court sustained the defense, Shell Oil Co. v. Marinello, 120 N.J. Super. 357, 392-93, 294 A.2d 253, 272 (Ch. Div. 1972) but the Supreme
Court expressly refrained from reviewing the finding. 63 N.J. at 407, 307 A.2d at 601.
11. Atlantic Refining Co. v. F.T.C., 381 U.S. 357 (1962); Shell Oil Co. v. F.T.C., 360
F.2d 470 (5th Cir. 1966). Note also that Texaco, Inc. v. Appleget, 63 N.J. 411, 307 A.2d 603
(1973), was decided the same day as Marinello. Citing Marinello, the per curiam opinion
in that case applied the same principle to a Texaco dealership.
12. 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960) [hereinafter referred to as Henningsen]. In Henningsen, the court held invalid a clause in the American Automobile Manufacturers standard
warranty. The clause purported to disclaim all non-enumerated warranties, express or implied. The plaintiff in that case was a consumer seeking damages for injuries to his wife, resulting from a defect in the car.
13. 50 N.J. 528, 236 A.2d 843 (1967) [hereinafter referred to as Dobbs]. This case involved a broker's suit to collect a commission. In holding for the client, the court expressed
sensitivity for the plight of members of the public who must deal with those who, through
experience, licensure, size or membership in associations, have acquired an overwhelming
bargaining advantage.
14. 63 N.J. at 408, 307 A.2d at 601-02 citing Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc.,
32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
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cial parties. In Moreira Construction Co. v. Moretrench Corp.,1 5 an exculpatory clause in an equipment lease was held valid although the lessor
was the world's largest supplier of that equipment. The court reasoned
that, because the lessee was experienced in business, the size difference
alone did not render the clause invalid.
The holding in Marinello, however, tacitly rejected this approach.
The relative bargaining positions of oil company and dealer were found
to be so disproportionate that "[f]or all practical purposes Shell [could]
dictate its own terms."' 6 In effect, then, the policy of invalidating oppressive clauses engendered by coercive relationships is not confined to consumer transactions, nor is it necessarily vitiated by the business experience
7
of the parties.1
The second part of the test requires that the clause be "grossly unfair."'" As written, both the lease and dealer contract give each party a
comparable right to terminate." But, as the opinion explains:
It is a fallacy to state that the right of termination is bilateral.
The oil company can always get another person to operate the
station. It is the incumbent dealer who has everything to lose
since, even if he had another location to go to, the going business
and trade he built up would remain with the old station. °
The third part of the test requires that the "grossly unfair" provision
must tend to injure the public in some way. It is the protection of this
large class of persons, who, although not parties to the agreement are indirectly affected by its provisions, which justifies voiding the unambiguous
terms of the contract. In applying this rationale, Marinello goes beyond
Henningsen and Dobbs. The protected parties in those cases were consumers, while Marinello was a retail businessman. The impact of termination upon the dealer, no matter how oppressive, is pertinent from a policy
standpoint only insofar as it produces injury to his customers.
15. 97 N.J. Super. 391, 235 A.2d 211 (App. Div. 1967).
16. 63 N.J. at 408, 307 A.2d at 601. This type of situation was vividly described by
Judge Wisdom of the 5th Circuit:
The relationship of a major oil company to its service station dealer goes beyond the
bigness-littleness antithesis that exists in innumerable contract negotiations and in

the operation of a modern, large business. The inherent leverage a major oil company has over its dealers results from the market structure of the industry and the
special dependence on the company of the service station dealer (who is usually
also a lessee). .

. .

A man operating a gas station is bound to be overawed by the

great corporation that is his supplier, his banker, and his landlord.
Shell Oil Co. v. F.T.C., 360 F.2d 470, 487 (5th Cir. 1966). But see Weaver v. American Oil
Co., 276 N.E.2d 144, 153 (Ind. 1971) (dissenting opinion), asserting that, because the dealer

entered into the contracts with economic benefit as a motive, there was no coercion, and
thus nothing to indicate a lack of "substantial equality" in his bargaining power.
17. In fact, Marinello's status may have increased the disparity. His investment of time
and labor made him less likely to risk confrontation with the oil company. 63 N.J. at 409,
307 A.2d at 601.
18. See text following note 11, supra.
19. The termination provisions are described in the text preceding note 1 supra.
20. 63 N.J. at 409, 307 A.2d at 602.
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There is no paucity of commentators seeking to describe the nature
and extent of this injury. 1 It is said to result from the coercion inherent
in the power to terminate virtually at will. This leverage, effective without
resort to statutorily prohibited practices,' reduces the local dealer's independence as a retailer. He is thereby constrained to purchase tires, batteries and accessories from a particular oil company rather than bargain
for more favorable terms from another supplier. The additional costs resulting from this inefficient method of purchasing are passed on to the
consumer in the form of higher prices. In place of examining this theory,
however, the court simply cited the New Jersey Unfair Motor Fuels Practices Act.2 3 In the Legislative Declaration of Policy, this Act deems the
distribution of motor fuels to be a matter of "public interest."
In addition to the case law discussed above, the court cited the newlyenacted New Jersey Franchise Practice Act 24 in support of its reformation of the contract in favor of Marinello. The court recognized that, had
this Act been effective at the last renewal of the contracts, it would have
directly controlled the relationship, which was found to be "basically that
of franchise. '25 The existence of this Act, as an authoritative declaration
of New Jersey public policy, might be utilized to distinguish the Marinello holding in jurisdictions without analogous statutes. However, the
opinion expressly states that the Act "merely put into statutory form the
extant public policy of the state." 26 In essence, this policy recognizes certain economic consequences of abuses in the marketing of such a vital
commodity as gasoline. The task facing terminated dealers or franchisees
in other jurisdictions is to bring forth similar expressions of policy.
As a statement of judicial policy, then, Marinello combines the "basic
doctrine that courts will not permit themselves to be instruments of inequity and injustice1 27 with the belief that one-sided commercial contracts
can harm the public. Its utility to gasoline dealers as a remedy against
termination depends upon the readiness of other jurisdictions to employ
these principles in the absence of specific statutory provisions.
PAUL

J.

BONAVIA

21. See Comment, Dealer Franchising in the Gasoline Industry: Current Developments,
4 U.S.F.L. REv. 65 (1969).
22. See note 4 supra.
23. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:6-17 (1964).

24. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:10-1, et. seq. (Supp. 1973). The Act prohibits a franchisor
from terminating, cancelling or failing to renew a franchise without good cause, which is
defined as the failure by the franchisee to substantially comply with the requirements imposed
on him by the franchise. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:10-5 (Supp. 1973).
25. 63 N.J. at 409, 307 A.2d at 602.
26. Id.
27. United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 315 U.S. 289, 326 (1942).

